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TAXATION
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided sev-
eral notable cases that indicate new trends in the law of federal taxation. Part I
examines O'Gilvie v. United States,' which discussed the inclusion of punitive
damage awards in gross income, a subject that baffles many courts. In
O'Gilvie, the Tenth Circuit was the first to interpret Commissioner v.
Schleier,2 a recent Supreme Court decision clarifying the issue of punitive
damages.
Several significant decisions in the survey period examined issues relating
to tax liens. Part II analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Burrus v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission,3 in which the court considered the relative priori-
ty of state and federal tax liens.' The court failed, however, to consider the
decisions of other federal courts and may have reached an incorrect outcome.
Part III reviews In re CF&I Fabricators, Inc.,' in which the Tenth Circuit
considered the proper characterization of a "tax" imposed on the accumulated
funding deficiency of a pension plan.6 The characterization of this federal lien
as a tax or penalty determined the priority afforded it in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Part IV discusses a third case focusing on federal tax liens. In re LMS
Holding Co.' considered whether the Internal Revenue Service must refile to
perfect a lien against corporate property purchased by another corporation as
part of a liquidation plan.' The case required an analysis of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
In the area of estate and gift tax, Part V examines DePaoli v. Commis-
sioner.9 The court analyzed the validity of a disclaimer and relevant state laws
of intestacy. The DePaoli analysis provides an informative survey of state
intestacy laws.
Finally, Part VI involves a gift revaluation by the IRS and the effect of
below-market interest rates on promissory notes given in exchange for the gift.
In Schusterman v. United States, ° the Tenth Circuit attempted to resolve this
issue, which previously had caused a split in the courts of appeals.
1. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).
2. 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (reiterating the analysis first articulated in United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
3. 59 F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 148.
5. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. CL 558 (1995).
6. In re CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1157.
7. 50 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. In re LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1527.
9. 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1995).
10. 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).
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I. THE TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
The taxation of punitive damages has a long and troubled history in feder-
al courts." Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) excludes
from gross income amounts received "on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness.""2 Theoretically, punitive damages should be fully taxed as income to
the recipient since they serve no compensatory purpose: they fail to compen-
sate for losses and instead result in a windfall to the injured party. 3 Because
punitive damages are generally related to personal injury or sickness, however,
they often are exempt from taxation. Courts construe the exact language of §
104(a)(2) differently and reach divergent results. 4
Prior to O'Gilvie v. United States" the majority of circuit courts held
that punitive damage awards should be included in gross income and subject
to the federal income tax. 6 While the Supreme Court has ruled on related
issues involving § 104(a)(2), the proper application of these decisions to the
punitive damages dispute remains unclear.
In United States v. Burke, 7 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
settlement of a back pay claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was gross income under § 104(a)(2). 8 In order for § 104(a)(2) to apply, the
Court stated that the taxpayer must show that any award received served to re-
dress a "tort-like personal injury." 9 The Supreme Court held that back pay
11. For a detailed analysis on the taxation of punitive damages, see James Serven, The Taxa-
tion of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays An Egg?, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 215 (1995).
12. Section 104(a)(2) provides:
(a) In general.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) de-
ductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include-...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness ....
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). Otherwise, subject to additional exceptions, gross income includes "all
income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
13. Compensatory damages serve only to make the injured party whole, and, therefore, result
in no income to the taxpayer, while punitive damages "are a windfall to the recipient and as such
should be taxed in full." Serven, supra note 11, at 228-29. Under this "return of capital theory,"
awards that do not result in additional income to the injured party or leave him in a better position
than before, should be exempt from tax. Id.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1992); Wesson v. United States,
48 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1995); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696-97 (9th Cir.
1983).
15. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).
16. See, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed.
Cit. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit, howev-
er, recently departed from its sister circuits when it ruled that § 104(a)(2) "does not permit a dis-
tinction between punitive and compensatory damages." Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631
(6th Cir. 1994).
17. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
18. Burke, 504 U.S. at 230.
19. Id. at 237. Unlike lower courts, the Supreme Court made no distinction between physical
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awards were not excludable from gross income because they did not compen-
sate for a "tort-like personal injury."2
Following Burke, a number of appellate courts applied its reasoning to the
issue of punitive damages taxation.2 Only one court, the Sixth Circuit in
Horton v. Commissioner," held that § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages
from gross income." Relying on Burke, the Sixth Circuit found that punitive
damages arising from gross negligence resulted from a personal injury and
were excludable from gross income. 4
The Supreme Court recently returned to the punitive damages issue in
Commissioner v. Schleier.2" In Schleier, the taxpayer excluded from gross
income the liquidated damages from a settlement under the Age Discrimina-
tion and Employment Act (ADEA). 6 The Court reiterated the Burke test: not
only must the claim be based on torts or tort-like rights, but it must also be
personal in nature."
B. O'Gilvie v. United States
8
1. Facts
Betty O'Gilvie died of toxic shock syndrome (TSS). 9 Her husband, ad-
ministrator of her estate, sued International Playtex, Inc., who manufactured
the tampons O'Gilvie used when she contracted TSS.3° The Court awarded
the estate actual damages of approximately $1.5 million and punitive damages
of $1.35 million.3' The estate distributed these amounts to the beneficiaries,
including the husband and children, who included the punitive damages in
their gross income and promptly sued for refunds of the taxes they paid.3'
The children received refunds.33 The district court held that in the husband's
and non-physical injuries. Id. at 238. The Court established a new "scope of the remedies" analy-
sis to determine whether "tort-like" rights are involved in the dispute. Id. at 234-37; see also
Serven, supra note 11, at 254-60 (discussing application of the Burke analysis).
20. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241-42.
21. See, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084; Reese, 24 F.3d at 235;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
22. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
23. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
24. Id. at 631-32.
25. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
26. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162. The taxpayer, however, did include amounts received as
backpay in his gross income. Id. Clearly, the amounts received as back pay were not on account
of personal injury or sickness. Id. at 2164. Any amounts which might have been received as com-
pensation for some psychological harm, however, may have been entitled to exclusion under §
104(a)(2). Id.
27. Id. at 2167. The Court held that claims under ADEA are not tort-like and, therefore, any
recoveries thereunder are not to be excluded from gross income. Id.
28. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).




33. Id. Two years later the IRS sued to recover these amounts as erroneous refunds. Id. All
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case, the amounts received as punitive damages were excludable from gross
income.34 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. 5
2. Decision
The court addressed four factors in its analysis.36 First, the title of § 104,
"[c]ompensation for injuries or sickness," suggests that only compensatory
awards are excludable from income.37 Second, the predecessor statute to §
104 implied that unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are not a
return of capital and are income.38 Third, the Tenth Circuit considered the
Supreme Court cases of Burke and Schleier and distinguished them from the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Horton.39 Finally, the court focused on the policy
of narrowly construing any exclusions from income. '
With regard to the third factor, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Horton
court focused solely on the punitive damages claim.4' The Tenth Circuit
found this method erroneous, since Burke required a more thorough analysis
of the situation.42 Thus, the Horton court considered the first part of the
Burke test, but did not address whether the punitive damages were received
"on account of' personal injury. The Tenth Circuit, therefore, found Horton
unpersuasive and proceeded to define "on account of," which the Supreme
Court had failed to do in both Burke and Schleier.43
In interpreting this phrase, the Tenth Circuit followed four other circuits,
holding that punitive damage awards are taxable, and noted that the phrase "on
account of' is susceptible to two interpretations. First, the phrase may describe
a causal relationship in which punitive damages result from injury." Second,
the phrase may describe a causal relationship in which the injury itself deter-
mines the damages.4' The Tenth Circuit looked to the legislative history of §
parties agreed to be bound by the resolution of Kelly's suit. Id.
34. Id. at 1553.
35. Id. at 1560.
36. Other circuits have focused on numerous factors in making a determination as to the
applicability of § 104(a)(2). These factors include: (1) the statutory context and title; (2) the prin-
ciple that exclusions from income should be construed narrowly; (3) the policy and legislative
history of § 104; (4) a Treasury Revenue Ruling addressing this issue; (5) the 1989 amendment to
§ 104(a)(2); and (6) Supreme Court cases discussing § 104 in other contexts. Id. at 1556.
37. Id. at 1558.
38. Id. (agreeing with the Federal Circuit's analysis in Reese, 24 F.3d 228). Other courts
hold that the purpose of § 104 is limited to compensatory damages which make the taxpayer
whole again. Id. Because lost wages awarded due to some physical injury are compensatory and
excluded from income, the court noted that the taxpayer is made "more than whole": if she had
actually worked for those wages they would be taxable income and additional tax would be pay-
able. Id. at 1558-59.
39. Id. at 1556-57.
40. See, e.g., Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163.
41. Horton, 35 F.3d at 361 ("This is the beginning and end of the inquiry."). Id.
42. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1557; see also Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2159 (supporting the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of Burke). Schleier made it clear that Burke should be interpreted as requir-
ing a two-part test: first, whether the injury involved tort-type rights, and second, whether the
damages were received on account of personal injuries. Id. at 2167.
43. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1557.
44. Id. Therefore, punitive damages would be excluded from gross income because ultimate-
ly they are awarded on account of a personal injury. Id.
45. Id. In this case, punitive damages are not excluded because punitive damages are not
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104(a)(2) for the proper interpretation of this clause, particularly its 1989
amendment.' This examination, however, proved inconclusive." Thus, the
Tenth Circuit opted to follow "the default rule that exclusions from income are
narrowly construed," and found for the government. '
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision exemplifies the confusion over punitive dam-
ages taxation. Past congressional attempts to correct the problem have only
compounded the problem, as reflected by the O'Gilvie decision. The Tenth
Circuit's decision does not differ in substance from those of other circuit
courts that have held punitive damages taxable. The decision rejects the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Horton, thereby reaffirming the analyses and outcomes of
the other courts of appeals. O'Glivie is also significant for its application of
the Supreme Court's Schleier decision, as it clarified the applicable tests in
punitive damages analysis.
4. Other Circuits
Since the Tenth Circuit's decision in O'Gilvie, the circuits, with the ex-
ception of the Sixth Circuit, favor subjecting punitive damages awards to
federal taxation by five to one.4
II. STATE TAx LIEN PRIORITY
A. Background
Generally, a state tax lien merits priority in payment over a federal tax
lien if it is perfected, or "choate," before the federal lien comes into exis-
tence." The determination of tax lien priority represents another area of
received based on the injuries, but rather on the unreasonable and outrageous conduct of the de-
fendant. Id.
46. Id. at 1559. The 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) provides that the exclusion "shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a). Congress's use of the double negative has confused many courts. See
Serven, supra note 11, at 260. There are several interpretations of Congressional intent in enacting
this amendment and three possible results of the amendment. Id. at 262-66. First, punitive damag-
es awarded in connection with non-physical injuries are now taxable while those awarded in con-
nection with physical injuries are tax exempt. Id. at 262-63. Second, punitive damages are always
taxable. Id. at 263-64. Third, Congress only spoke as to the taxability of punitive damages in fully
taxable non-physical injuries and made no decision regarding the taxability of punitive damages
awarded in cases involving physical injuries. Id. at 264-66. The Tenth Circuit stated, "We believe
that using the amendment to interpret Congress' intent in 1954 (or 1918) is a questionable prac-
tice, particularly because of the long lapse of time and because the legislative history of both the
original statute and the amendment are not enlightening." O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1559.
47. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1560. The court noted that "good reasons tug each way" in refer-
ence to the possible interpretations of the clause based on an analysis of the legislative history. Id.
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that a determination of which interpretation was more correct
was not necessary to decide the outcome of this case. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084; Reese, 24 F.3d at 235;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
50. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 59 F.3d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme
19961
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taxation troubling the Tenth Circuit, as demonstrated by its decision in
McDermott v. Zion First National Bank."
In United States v. City of New Britain,52 the Supreme Court stated that
when a solvent debtor exists, a federal lien is subordinate to any prior perfect-
ed liens." In that case, certain real property was foreclosed by judicial sale,
the proceeds of which were insufficient to satisfy both municipal and federal
liens. 4 The Supreme Court established a three-part "choateness" test to deter-
mine whether a state lien is entitled to priority over a subsequent federal
lien.55 The test states that "when the identity of the lienor, the property sub-
ject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established," the state lien is
choate.56
Subsequent to the New Britain decision, the Tenth Circuit, in T.H. Rogers
Lumber Co. v. Apel," addressed the issue of lien priority between a claim by
the federal government and two mechanics' and materialmen's liens.58 In
T.H. Rogers, a federal claim was perfected prior to the mechanic and
materialmen's liens; however, the mechanics and materialmen had commenced
work on the property to which all liens attached before the federal government
had perfected its lien. 9 The state lien holders argued that their liens related to
the commencement of work and were entitled to priority over the federal
government's claims.' The Tenth Circuit held that liens created under state
law must be "enforceable by summary proceedings [to be] ... specific and
perfected on the date the federal lien was recorded."6 Since the mechanics'
and materialmen's liens were still indefinite (as to amount) and, therefore
Court has often used the "choateness doctrine" to frustrate the priority of state tax liens. Michael
D. McCullogh, Note, When First in Time Is Not First in Right: The Supreme Court Frustrates
Judgment Creditors in United States v. McDermott, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 414 (1994).
51. 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S.
447 (1993); see also James Serven, Taxation, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 1063 (1994); James Serven,
Taxation, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 1037, 1076 (1992); (discussing the Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit McDermott opinions). In McDermott, the Tenth Circuit held that a prior perfected federal
tax lien did not extend to after-acquired property. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481. Predictably, the
Supreme Court reversed. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
52. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
53. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 87 ("[W]ith no question of insolvency involved ... 'the
first in time is the first in right."'). Id. There is no question that where the debtor or estate is
insolvent a claim of the federal government, whether for taxes or not, is always entitled to priori-
ty. 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (1995).
54. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 82-83. The state liens were for delinquent real estate
taxes and water rent, while the federal taxes secured unpaid federal withholding and unemploy-
ment taxes, as well as unpaid insurance contributions. Id.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id. If the state tax lien is choate when the federal lien is filed, then the state lien is enti-
tled to priority. Id. The Supreme Court further addressed the issues in New Britain and determined
that where a state-created lien is perfected before a federal lien, the federal lien is entitled to prior-
ity with respect to after-acquired property. McDermott, 507 U.S. at 455.
57. 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. T.H. Rogers, 468 F.2d at 15-16.
59. Id. at 18-19.
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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unperfected at the time the federal lien was perfected, the latter took priori-
ty. .62
B. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
63
1. Facts
On October 7, 1986, the Oklahoma Tax Commission filed a tax warrant
against Vernon V. Burrus and his wife for unpaid withholding taxes.' On
March 23, 1989, and November 16, 1989, the IRS assessed penalties against
the Burruses for unpaid taxes. 65 They subsequently sold their house, but the
proceeds were insufficient to satisfy both the state and federal tax claims.'
The IRS acknowledged that the state liens should receive priority for payment,
because the state liens pre-dated those of the federal government, provided the
state liens were choate when filed.67
The Oklahoma State Constitution provides a homestead exemption that
prohibits the attachment or forced sale of a principal residence for the satisfac-
tion of a debt.' Relying on T.H. Rogers, the federal district court added a
new "enforceability" element to the New Britain three part test to determine
the choateness of a nonfederal tax lien.69 The district court held that because
the Oklahoma homestead exemption prevented the state lien from attaching
and becoming enforceable, the state lien was not entitled to priority over the
federal government's claim.7"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that the New Britain test had been satisfied,7
and rejected the district court's imposition of an additional enforceability re-
quirement.72 The Tenth Circuit held that the only additional element that may
62. Id. at 18-19.
63. 59 F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995).
64. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 850 F. Supp. 963, 964 (W.D. Okla. 1993), rev'd, 59
F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995). A similar warrant was recorded with respect to Mr. Burrus's wife on




68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(1) (1991). "[Tlhe following property shall be reserved to
every person residing in the state, exempt from the attachment or execution and every other spe-
cies of forced sale for the payment of debts .... The home of such person, provided that such
home is the principal residence of such person .... " Id.
69. Burrus, 850 F. Supp. at 964; see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
70. Burrus, 850 F. Supp. at 965.
71. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 149.
72. Id. In rejecting this approach the Tenth Circuit stated:
[W]e interpret T.H. Rogers to mean not that the lien must be immediately enforceable
by summary proceedings at the time of filing, but rather that at the time of enforcement,
whenever that should occur, a lienholder may satisfy its debt by resort to a summary
proceeding because the lien will be both choate and perfected.
1996]
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be necessary in proving choateness or perfection is that the lien must attach to
an "identifiable piece of property.
7 3
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the Oklahoma homestead exemption
which provides that no debt shall "attach" to the debtor's principal
residence.74 Because the Tax Commission's lien could not attach to any iden-
tifiable piece of property, it appeared incapable of becoming choate." The
Tenth Circuit interpreted the word "attachment" in the Oklahoma statute to
mean the physical seizure of a principal residence.76 Therefore, the state lien
could attach to the Burrus's principal residence but could not be executed."
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit decision failed to consider the body of law, rooted in
interpretations of Supreme Court opinions, recognizing the enforceability ele-
ment. Two courts of appeals' decisions have addressed the issue of enforce-
ability of a lien as a prerequisite to choateness." These cases analyzed simi-
lar issues, namely, whether a state tax lien is sufficiently choate and entitled to
priority over an IRS lien. The Third Circuit ruled that choateness requires
enforceability.79 That court refused to rule in favor of the IRS because the
state lien was enforceable."s The Third Circuit relied in part on the federal
district court decisions in T.H. Rogers and Burrus.' The Third Circuit also
relied on several additional federal court decisions, many of them Tenth Cir-
cuit district court opinions. 2 Furthermore, the court cited several United
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. In order for perfection to occur a lien must first attach to identifiable property. With
regard to attachment and perfection, see U.C.C. §§ 9-203 and 9-303 (1995).
76. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 150. The court noted that this is the exact harm the homestead ex-
emption was designed to prevent. Id. The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation consistent with an
earlier decision and a similar Kansas Supreme Court decision. See Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775
(10th Cir. 1980); Homestead Land Title Co. v. United States, 819 P.2d 660 (Kan. 1991). In Home-
stead, the federal district court transferred the case to the Kansas Supreme Court to determine
whether a lien for unpaid sales taxes could attach to real property despite state homestead exemp-
tion. Homestead Land Title Co. v. United States, No. 90-4116-SAC, 1993 WL 360389, at *3-*4
(D. Kan. Aug. 17, 1993). The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished between the attachment of a
tax lien to the homestead and the ability to force the sale of the homestead. Id. at *2.
77. "[A] properly filed state tax lien does 'attach' to homestead property for purposes of
determining priority ... even though it cannot be enforced at the time of filing." Burrus, 59 F.3d
at 150.
78. Monica Fuel, Inc. v. IRS, 56 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1995); see In re Terwilliger's Ca-
tering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
79. Monica Fuel, Inc., 56 F.3d. at 513 ("Choateness only requires that the state have a right
to enforce its lien in a summary fashion.").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 512-13. T.H. Rogers, as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit, only stood for the propo-
sition that a lien must be enforceable at the time of enforcement, not at the time of filing, and of
course, Burrus was reversed by the Tenth Circuit.
82. See Homestead, 1993 WL 360389, at *3; United States v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 642
F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (D. Utah 1983). The former case sent a certified question to the Kansas Supreme
Court, on which the Tenth Circuit relied to reach its decision in Burrus. See supra note 76-77 and
accompanying text. While the federal district court in Homestead recognized that the state sales
taxes in that case could attach to the homestead, it also recognized an enforceability element to es-
tablishing that a state tax lien is choate. Homestead, 1993 WL 360389, at *3. In keeping with this
principle, the district court sent another certified question to the Kansas Supreme Court to deter-
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States Supreme Court decisions implying that the additional enforceability
requirement exists.83
The Sixth Circuit also found enforceability to be a prerequisite to
choateness s4 The Sixth Circuit's decision rested on a parallel Supreme Court
case,8 5 and the Supreme Court's statement that "the choateness rule should be
similar to the rule of priorities established for cases where an insolvent debtor
is subject to a tax lien. 86
The decisions of the Third and Sixth Circuits undermine the Tenth
Circuit's holding. 7 While the interpretation of enforceability remains unclear,
the Supreme Court's statements imply that enforceability should be a require-
ment in determining if the state lien is choate. The Tenth Circuit's abrupt
departure from this interpretation suggests that other courts of appeals are
unlikely to follow.
III. ACCUMULATED FUNDING DEFICIENCIES
A. Background
The Code requires that an employer who maintains a qualified employee
benefit plan must meet minimum funding standards.8 The employer can meet
these standards by ensuring that the qualified plan has accumulated no funding
deficiencies. 9 Failure to meet the minimum funding requirements results in
mine whether the homestead exemption prevented the creditor from foreclosing on its sales tax
lien. Id. at *4. In Jones v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 594 P.2d 162, 166-67 (Kan.
1979), the court found that taxes were excepted from the homestead exemption, and that a forced
sale could begin against a homestead to satisfy a tax lien. Id.; see In re Johnson, 872 P.2d 308,
310-11 (Kan. 1994). Therefore, in Homestead, the sales tax lien would have been entitled to prior-
ity because it was enforceable. With further analysis of the confusing events in Homestead and the
related Kansas Supreme Court cases, the Tenth Circuit may have become aware of the detailed
analysis those courts engaged in and, as a result, the Tenth Circuit may have been persuaded to
rule otherwise. Essentially, in ruling against the enforceability element, the Tenth Circuit relied in
part on a Kansas case which addressed an issue solely for the benefit of a federal district court
which found that the enforceability element existed.
83. Monica Fuel, Inc., 56 F.3d at 512 n.13 (citing McDermott, 507 U.S. at 452 n.5 (ac-
knowledging that the lien therein "was perfected ... in the sense that it was definite as to the
property in question, noncontingent, and summarily enforceable")); United States v. Vermont, 377
U.S. 351, 359 n.12 (1964) (acknowledging that the "municipal liens accorded priority in New Brit-
ain were also characterized as summarily enforceable").
84. "[T]he state lien holder must show that he had the right to enforce the lien at some time
prior to the attachment of the federal lien." Terwilliger's, 911 F.2d at 1176. Note that this decision
barely preceded that of the Tenth Circuit's; therefore, the court may not have had the benefit of
reviewing the Sixth Circuit's opinion.
85. Id. A state lien holder must be able to enforce the lien prior to attachment of the federal
lien. Id. Otherwise, "[n]umerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien
from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded." Id. (quoting United States v.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950)).
86. Id.; see supra note 50.
87. Another federal court of appeals addressed this issue and it is reasonable to infer that it
recognizes an enforceability element. See In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp. v. Herzog, 457 F.2d
409, 414 n.8 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. I.R.C. § 412(a) (1994).
89. Id. In general terms, the accumulated funding deficiency is the amount by which the
charges to the standard funding account exceed the credits to such an account. See id.
1996]
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the assessment of a tax equal to ten percent of the deficiency at the end of any
plan year.' Most employers who fail to maintain the minimum funding stan-
dards do so as a consequence of financial hardship.9' This was the case in In
re CF&I Fabricators,92 where the employer failed to meet the minimum
funding standards before petitioning for Chapter 11 reorganization.93
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, excise taxes accruing before bankruptcy
or penalties to compensate for pecuniary losses merit priority payment.94
While the provisions allowing the tax on accumulated funding deficiencies
come under the Internal Revenue Code section "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,"
that label is not necessarily determinative of the tax's priority in bankrupt-
cy.95 The tax may, in fact, be more adequately described as a penalty. The
tax should be analyzed under a four-part test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
In re Lorber Industries' to determine if it is an excise tax or a penalty.97
The four factors include whether the "tax" is imposed: (1) as an involuntary
monetary burden; (2) pursuant to statutory law; (3) for public purposes; and
(4) under the police or taxing power.98
B. In re CF&I Fabricators99
1. Facts
The debtors filed petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 to reorganize
because of their inability to fund two pension plans."°° The IRS then filed
notice of claims for taxes imposed pursuant to § 4971 and alleged that the
taxes, almost $42 million, merited priority status under § 507 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.'' The debtors argued that these taxes were penalties and
90. I.R.C. § 4971(a) (1994). Additional taxes equal to the amount of the deficiency are im-
posed if the deficiency is not promptly corrected. I.R.C. § 4971(b).
91. In re CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995).
92. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1156.
93. Id. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to file for bankruptcy without
surrendering all non-exempt assets to creditors. 4 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 20.1, at 3 (6th ed. 1994). Under the automatic stay the debtor receives temporary
relief from creditors while the debtor develops a plan for reorganization and repayment of credi-
tors. Id.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E), (G) (1994). CF&I determined that the priority status afforded
these taxes was located at § 507(a)(7)(E), (G). CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1156. This Survey will refer to
the amended provisions as the texts are virtually identical.
95. "Congress' labeling of [an] exaction as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority
in bankruptcy." CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1157 (quoting In re Cassidy, 983 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir.
1992)).
96. 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066.
98. Id. Failing any part of this test leads to a conclusion that the assessment was a penalty
rather than a tax. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
99. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995).
100. In re CF&I Fabricators, 148 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 558 (1995).
101. Id. at 335, 337.
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should have been disallowed. 2 The bankruptcy court agreed with the debt-
ors and refused to grant the liens priority status.13
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings and its analy-
sis of the § 4971 tax under the four-part Lorber test.0 4 The court reinforced
the doctrine that the label Congress places on an exaction is not determinative
of its status as a tax or penalty. 5 Neither the bankruptcy court nor the Tenth
Circuit presented a detailed analysis of the Lorber test. Therefore, the applica-
tion of the facts in this case to that test is provided below.
3. Analysis
The imposition of the tax in CF&I resulted from an obligation to which
the debtors did not consent; therefore, it meets the first part of the Lorber test
because it was an involuntary monetary burden."° The tax also fulfills the
second part of the Lorber test because it was imposed pursuant to the Internal
Revenue Code. With regard to the third part of the test, however, the tax
serves no benefit, such as defraying governmental expenses, to the public. 7
The tax merely serves to insure the adequacy of funding certain employee
benefit plans. The bankruptcy court noted that affording the § 4971 tax priori-
ty would result in additional harm to the individuals that the tax was designed
to protect." Finding that the § 4971 tax could not meet the requirements of
the Lorber test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax was neither a penalty
nor entitled to priority status."
102. Id. Additionally, the debtors came to an agreement with the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) to terminate one plan, after which the PBGC would act as successor trustee
of the plan and become liable for benefits to plan participants. Id. at 336. The debtors objected to
many of the taxes, claiming that the plan of reorganization or direction of the bankruptcy court
prevented the payment of funds to the plan. Id. Therefore, the debtors claimed that it was ineq-
uitable for the IRS to continue assessing taxes for the accumulated funding deficiency. Id. The
bankruptcy court, as well as the Tenth Circuit, addressed additional claims of equitable subordi-
nation in this case. Id.; CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158. Although beyond the scope of this Survey, the
issue of equitable subordination is perhaps the most important issue in this case and was the rea-
son a petition for certiorari has been granted. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that a nonpecuniary loss
tax penalty claim could be equitably subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors. Id.
at 1159. The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in light of Congress's express intention to
provide priority to tax penalties. In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 48 F.3d 210, 212 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995). Both circuits held that it was reasonable to allow the bankruptcy
court to exercise its discretion in order to ensure fair treatment and an equitable result. Id. at 218;
CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1159.
103. In re CF&I Fabricators, 148 B.R. at 343.
104. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158.
105. See supra note 95.
106. See In re Farmers Frozen Food Co., 221 F. Supp. 385, 387 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
107. Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066.
108. CF&I, 148 B.R. at 339. Affording the IRS's claims priority would be at the expense of
unsecured pre-petition creditors which include the members of the pension plans themselves. Id.
The IRS acknowledged that if the court accepted the Lorber analysis, this third prong of the test
could not be met. Id. at 338. With regard to the last part of the Lorber test, the § 4971 tax was
clearly imposed pursuant to the federal government's taxing or police powers.
109. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158. The legislative history of § 4971 further substantiates this hold-
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4. Other Circuits
The Sixth Circuit was the only other circuit court to treat the issue pre-
sented in CF&I."° The Sixth Circuit relied on Congress's label of § 4971 as
an excise tax as dispositive"' and refused to consider the Lorber test."2 It
rejected the holding that labels are not determinative as to whether a lien is a
tax or a penalty and concluded that federal courts do not have unlimited li-
cense to challenge Congress's designation of certain taxes."3
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpreted the priority status afforded §
4941 exactions, albeit in reference to a different code section." 4 They con-
sidered whether, for bankruptcy purposes, a court may look beyond Congress's
characterization of an exaction. Both circuits held that the characterization of §
4941 exactions as a tax would contradict the very notion of fairness and public
policy against punishing innocent creditors. "'
At least one commentator has stated that it was unfortunate that the Su-
preme Court did not resolve the circuit split."6 In light of recent Supreme
Court decisions favoring the plain meaning rule,"7 many courts confronting
this issue will likely side with the Sixth Circuit's decision. In light of Tenth
Circuit precedent, however, CF&I was correctly decided and should remain
the law until the Supreme Court confronts this issue.
IV. PERFECTION OF FEDERAL TAx LIENS
A. Background
When a taxpayer fails to pay assessed taxes, the tax due becomes a lien
"upon all property and rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer."' Gen-
erally, the lien is not perfected and enforceable against third parties until no-
tice has been properly filed pursuant to state law.' The Bankruptcy Code
ing: "The [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] provides new and more effective penalties
where employers fail to meet funding standards .... [T]he bill places the obligation for funding
and the penalty for underfunding on the person to whom it belongs-namely, the employer." H.R.
REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong, 2d Sess. 25 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4694 (em-
phasis added).
110. In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1092 (1992).
111. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1062.
112. Id. at 1057. The bankruptcy court in that case applied the four-part test and found that
the § 4971 exaction failed the third prong of the test. In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 80 B.R.
395, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
113. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1059-60.
114. See In re Kline, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977) (adopting the reasoning of the district
court); In re Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978). Section 4941 imposes a "tax"
for self-dealing between a taxpayer and an exempt foundation. See David L. Kwass, Note, Excise
Taxes in Bankruptcy: United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. Holds Congress to Its Word,
12 VA. TAx REv. 513, 522 (1993).
115. Kline, 586 F.2d at 1038; Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d at 1037-38.
116. Kwass, supra note 114, at 523.
117. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
118. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).
119. I.R.C. § 6323(a), (f) (1994). Subsection (f) provides that state law determines the proper
place for filing, although the subsection does provide some default rules. I.R.C. § 6323(f). Every
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provides that a trustee may avoid any unperfected statutory lien against a
"bona fide purchaser... whether or not such purchaser exists."2 Federal
law looks to the law of the applicable state to determine the rights of a bona
fide purchaser.'
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) grants priority to claims of lien
creditors over the claims of unperfected secured creditors.'22 The U.C.C. also
states that a filing of notice continues to be effective against the attached
collateral even upon transfer of the property.1
23
B. In re LMS Holding Co. 2
1. Facts
On January 25, 1988, the IRS perfected its lien against property held by
MAKO, Inc., a corporation which subsequently filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 1 .25 Retail Marketing Corp. (RMC) acquired the property, subject
to a tax lien, pursuant to the corporation's reorganization plan.'26 After the
transfer occurred, the IRS, with full knowledge of the transaction, chose not to
file notice of the tax lien against RMC.2 7 RMC then filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11."2 The bankruptcy court held that the IRS's failure to file
notice of the lien against RMC entitled the trustee to avoid the lien.'29 As a
state within the Tenth Circuit, with the exception of Utah, has enacted the Uniform Federal Lien
Registration Act, which provides that notices of liens on real property are filed in the office of the
county clerk where the property is located, while liens on personal property are generally to be
filed with the state's secretary of state (where the taxpayer is a corporation). See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-25-102(l)(b), (2)(a) (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2614(b), (c)(1) (1989); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-1-1(A), (B) (Michie 1995) (liens on personal property are filed in the county
where the taxpayer resides); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 3403(B), (C)(1) (1992) (liens on personal
property are filed in Oklahoma County); WYO. STAT. § 29-6-204(b), (c)(i) (Supp. 1995). Utah
provides that all federal liens are to be filed in the county in which the property subject to the lien
is located. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-6-1 (1994).
Generally, such notice must at least provide the identity of the taxpayer, the tax liability
under which the lien arose, and the date of the assessment. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) (as
amended in 1994). Federal tax liens need not describe the property attached since the obligation
becomes a lien on all property of the taxpayer. In re LMS Holding Co., 50 F.3d 1526, 1530 (10th
Cir. 1995).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1994).
121. See e.g., In re McClaim, 447 F.2d 241, 243-44 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972) (holding that the priority of the trustee is determined pursuant to the law of the state in
which the property is located).
122. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b), (3) (1995) (providing that generally "an unperfected security inter-
est is subordinate to the rights of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected").
123. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1995). The official comments state that no new filing is necessary in
this case. Id. official cmt. 8. "[Any person searching the condition of ownership of a debtor must
make inquiry as to the debtor's source of title, and must search in the name of a former owner if
circumstances seem to require it." Id.
124. 50 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
125. United States v. LMS Holding Co., 161 B.R. 1020, 1021 (N.D. Okla. 1993), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. RMC also agreed to assume all liabilities of MAKO. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1526.
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result, the IRS held an unsecured claim. 3 ° The district court affirmed, hold-
ing that the IRS had knowledge of the transfer of assets and was required to
file notice of the lien in the name of RMC.'
31
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that where the identity of a debtor has
truly changed, no new filing is necessary. 3 2 The transfer to RMC was not
merely a change in the debtor's identity, but rather a change to an unrelated
third party. 3 3 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit noted that RMC's assumption
of MAKO's tax liability did not justify characterizing RMC as the taxpayer in
this matter.'34 The Tenth Circuit's decision hinged on its interpretation of
U.C.C. § 9-402(7), which provides that the security interest in collateral con-
tinues to be effective even after the collateral is transferred to another par-
ty. 33 As a result, the IRS's lien continued to be effective against the proper-
ty purchased by RMC. The Tenth Circuit reversed the findings of the bank-
ruptcy and district courts.'36 The court also stated that the IRS was not enti-




The Tenth Circuit correctly decided that this was not a case of a debtor
name change but rather a complete transfer of assets to another entity. While
the U.C.C. states that a prior lien remains effective against the transferred
property, it makes no reference to extending that lien to additional property of
the acquiring party. It would not be surprising if this case came about as the
result of an IRS error in filing a financing statement and the agency's woeful
attempt to correct an inexcusable mistake.
V. FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAX DISCLAIMERS
A. Background
Taxes are based on the value of a decedent's estate.'38 In arriving at the
net taxable value of a decedent's estate, the value of all property transferred to
a surviving spouse is deducted from the gross estate.'39 Testamentary trans-
fers, such as a bequest pursuant to the decedent's will, may be disclaimed by
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1023.
132. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1528. The IRS relied on two cases where federal courts held
that a new filing was not necessary in the case of a name change of the debtor. Id. (citing Davis
v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 446 (C.D. I11. 1989); United States v. Clark, 81-1 T.C.M. (CCH)
9406 (S.D. Fla. 1981)).
133. Id. at 1528-29.
134. Id. RMC simply remains the transferee in this situation, not the taxpayer. Id.
135. For a further discussion of § 9-402(7), see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1530.
137. Id.
138. I.R.C. § 2001 (1994).
139. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1994).
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the recipient and such property will transfer pursuant to state law."4 If a re-
cipient of a testamentary transfer disclaims such interest and the property
transfers pursuant to state law to the surviving spouse, the estate is entitled to
deduct the transfer in arriving at the net taxable estate. 4'
A disclaimer is valid if it meets four requirements. The disclaimer must:
(1) be in writing; (2) be received by the transferor or his personal representa-
tive within certain time constraints; (3) be made by a person who receives no
interests or benefits of the property; and (4) pass such interest without direc-
tion on the part of the person making the disclaimer.'42
In the Tenth Circuit, a disclaimed interest passes as though the person
making the disclaimer predeceased the decedent. 43 The states generally man-
date that when the devisee or legatee is related to the testator and is treated as
if having predeceased the testator, all issue of the devisee or legatee take in
place of that individual.'"
B. DePaoli v. Commissioner
45
1. Facts
Quinto DePaoli, Sr. died, leaving his entire estate to his son Quinto
DePaoli, Jr."4 The son and Soila, Quinto Sr.'s wife, sought to have the pro-
bated will set aside so that the property would instead transfer to the moth-
er. 47 The son agreed to accept $600,000 from the estate in return for his de-
cision not to contest the will.' The federal tax return for the estate indicated
140. See Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 42, 67 (1993). For code provisions
discussing disclaimer, see I.R.C. §§ 2046, 2518 (1994).
141. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-l(b) (as amended in 1986) (qualifying the transfer for the sur-
viving spouse deduction).
142. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (emphasis added). If the formal requirements of § 2518 are met, the
transferred property is treated not as if the property passed from the transferor to the disclaimant
then to the ultimate taker, but instead as if the property passed directly from the transferor to the
ultimate taker. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Timely Disclaimers and Taxable Transfers, 47 U. MIAMi
L. REV. 1043, 1057 (1993). As a result, only one gift or estate tax is imposed rather than two
separate taxes on two transfers. Id. The resulting transfer closely resembles a power of appoint-
ment, the major difference being § 2518's formal requirements. Id. The two methods of transfer,
however, reach strikingly different results. While the use of a disclaimer results in no additional
tax, a power of appointment often results in additional taxes. Id. at 1057-58; see also I.R.C. §§
2038, 2041 (1994). Some commentators have suggested that disclaimers should be treated as
taxable transfers to achieve a more consistent outcome, simplify taxation, and end the problems
associated with determining if disclaimers meet the requirements of § 2518. Joan B. Ellsworth, On
Disclaimers: Let's Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38 VILL. L. REV. 693, 775 (1993).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-801(4)(a) (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2293(a)
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-801(D) (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 26 (1990); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-801(3) (1993); WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a)(ii) (1980 & Supp. 1995). Wyoming
is the only state providing that the interest will pass as if the disclaimant predeceased the decedent
only if the disclaimant is a residuary beneficiary. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-404 (a)(ii).
144. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-603(2)(a) (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615(a) (1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 142 (1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-605 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1980).
145. 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Depaoli, 62 F.3d at 1260.
147. Id.
148. Id. The $600,000 represents the maximum amount Quinto Sr. could have transferred to
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that the entire estate, less the $600,000 transferred to the son, passed to Soila
and thus qualified for the surviving spouse deduction. 9 He alleged that he
made a qualified disclaimer in which he directed that the property disclaimed
be transferred to Soila.'5 The Commissioner denied the marital deduction
arguing: (1) that the probated will bequeathed everything to the son; (2) that
the disclaimer was invalid due to the son's direction of the property to his
mother; and (3) that as a result of the invalid disclaimer, he was liable for gift
tax on the property transferred to his mother. 5' Quinto Sr.'s personal repre-
sentative and the son alleged that the disclaimer was valid because the proper-
ty would have passed to Soila in accordance with state law even without the
son's direction. 5 2 The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held the disclaim-
er invalid.'53
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit focused on whether the son's interest would have
passed, under state law, to Soila or his issue. The son had two illegitimate
children.' 54 Under New Mexico law, an illegitimate child is considered the
issue of the father if the father has signed a writing that the child is the
father's heir. 5 The Tax Court concluded that since the son included his two
illegitimate children as dependents on his tax return, this writing was sufficient
to meet the statutory requirements.'56 Thus, his interest would have passed to
his sons, rather than Soila, without his direction.'57 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, concluded that the Code's definition of "son" is broader than that of the
New Mexico probate code.'58 The court held that the tax returns were not
signed with the intent of recognizing the illegitimate children as his issue. 9
Under this interpretation, the disclaimed interest would have passed to Soila
pursuant to New Mexico law even without the son's direction, since the ille-
gitimate sons did not qualify as his issue."' Thus, the disclaimer was valid
under § 2518(b) of the Code. 6'
his son without his estate incurring any tax liability. I.R.C. § 6018 (1994). As a result, the tax-
payer claimed the entire estate would not be subject to tax since all $600,000 qualified for the
marital deduction and the remaining $600,000 was exempt from tax.
149. DePaoli, 62 F.3d at 1260. The return failed to indicate that the property transferred to
Soila as a result of a qualified disclaimer. Id.
150. Id. at 1260, 1266.
151. Id. at 1260-61.
152. Id. at 1261.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1262.
155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(B)(2) (Michie 1995).
156. DePaoli, 62 F.3d at 1263.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1264.
160. Id. at 1265.
161. Id. at 1265. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the only issue involving I.R.C. §
2518(b) before them was whether the disclaimer was invalid due to the son's direction of the




The Tenth Circuit's decision reflects the importance of examining state
intestacy and property laws when considering the federal estate tax. Congress,
by enacting the marital deduction, evidenced its intent that transfers of prop-
erty as a result of death should not be subject to tax. While the disclaimer in
this case was invalid, the ultimate transfer of property in DePaoli was of the
nature of those specifically deemed exempt from tax by Congress.
VI. THE GiFr TAx: SAFE HARBOR RATES Do NOT APPLY TO BELOW-
MARKEr LOANS
A. Background
A federal gift tax is imposed on the transfer of any property by gift.'62
The gift tax affects more than purely gratuitous transfers. For example, it can
apply to a sale or exchange of property where the fair market value of the
property transferred exceeds the value of the consideration given in
exchange.'63 It follows that when a taxpayer gives property in exchange for a
promissory note, gift taxes may be imposed to the extent that the fair market
value of the property transferred exceeds the fair market value of the note
received in exchange. In assessing the fair market value of a promissory note,
the IRS considers the face value of the note, the stated interest rate, the ap-
propriate market rate of interest, and the term of the note. 64
Under I.R.C. § 483, the holder of an installment contract which contains
"total unstated interest" may be forced to recognize payments representing
principal under contract terms as interest for income tax purposes.63 Section
483 serves to prevent the avoidance of income taxes, whereby payments re-
ceived under an installment contract are payments of principal which may be
taxed as a capital gain rather than payments of interest taxed as ordinary in-
come."6 Under this provision, the interest rate applied by the government in
assessing fair market value of the installment contract is a published rate regu-
larly determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.'67 If the sum of the pay-
ments of principal received under the installment contract terms exceeds the
present value of such principal payments and interest discounted at the rate
determined by the Secretary, the contract contains unstated interest.'
6
8
162. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1994).
163. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1994); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (excluding transactions made in the ordinary course
of business from this provision).
164. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204, 207 (1953).
165. I.R.C. § 483(a) (1994).
166. Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 1995). For a complete dis-
cussion of Schusterman, see infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
167. I.R.C. § 483(b) (1994); I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1994). The version of § 483 in place at the
time the Schusterman trusts were created provided that the interest rates were determined by the
Secretary. See Schusterman, 63 F.3d at 989. The amended version simply refers one to § 1274 for
determination of the applicable rate rather than to the regulations. I.R.C. § 483(b).
168. I.R.C. § 483(b).
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Portions of payments received must be recharacterized: from payments of
principal to payments of interest."6 If the terms of the installment contract
provide for an interest rate equal to or greater than the rate determined by the
Secretary, no recharacterization would be necessary. 7 '
In Schusterman, the Tenth Circuit decided whether § 483 applied to the
gift tax provisions of the Code. The two circuits that had previously addressed
this issue had reached conflicting conclusions. In Ballard v. Commissioner,7'
the taxpayer argued that the provisions of § 483 applied to all provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.'72 Thus, a taxpayer complying with the safe har-
bor rate provisions should not suffer a penalty by the imposition of gift taxes
where the safe harbor rate falls below the prevailing market rate of
interest.'73 The Seventh Circuit in Ballard ruled in favor of the taxpayer.'74
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals ruled otherwise when presented with a
similar argument.'75 Agreeing that § 483 applied to the entire Internal Reve-
nue Code, the Eight Circuit concurred with the tax court's determination that
"nothing in the language of § 483... indicates that this section has anything
to do with valuation."'
76
B. Schusterman v. United States 7'
1. Facts
The taxpayers, Charles and Lynn Schusterman, transferred stock to five
irrevocable trusts in exchange for promissory notes in the principal amount of
the fair market value of the stock, $7,954,046.178 The notes provided for in-
terest at a rate of six percent, which is the safe harbor rate as provided by §
483 and the appropriate treasury regulation.'79 The prevailing market interest
rate at that time was eleven and one-half percent. 80 Counsel advised the tax-
payers to set the interest rates of the promissory notes equal to the safe harbor
rate provided by § 483 to avoid the imposition of any gift taxes by the
IRS. '8 The IRS informed them that § 483 did not preclude the assessment
169. Id.
170. "In sum, I.R.C. § 483 prevents a seller of property under an installment contract for sale
or exchange of property from converting ordinary income (interest) into capital gains (principal)."
Schusterman, 63 F.3d at 990. The court continued: "The interest rate set by regulation is known as
the 'safe harbor' rate because a contract for the sale or exchange of property that employs the
interest rate will by definition never contain 'total unstated interest."' Id.
171. 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
172. Ballard, 854 F.2d at 187. Mrs. Ballard must have been relying on the prefatory language
of § 483 which states, "For purposes of this title ... [this provision applies to] the sale or ex-
change of any property." I.R.C. § 483(a)(1) (emphasis added). The word "title" refers to Title 26
of the United States Code, more commonly known as the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
173. Ballard, 854 F.2d at 187.
174. Id. at 189.
175. Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072
(1991).
176. Id. (quoting Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 887, 890 (1990)).
177. 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).






of gift taxes in this situation and taxed the difference between the value of the
stock transferred and the present value of the notes, discounted at the prevail-
ing eleven and one-half percent market interest rate.' The taxpayers paid
the gift taxes and then sued for a refund."3 The district court agreed with the
findings of the Eight Circuit in Krabbenhoft and held in favor of the IRS." 4
2. Decision
Like the federal district court, the Tenth Circuit sided with the Eight
Circuit's holding in Krabbenhoft. While recognizing that § 483 applies to all
provisions of the Code, the Tenth Circuit agreed that it is irrelevant for pur-
poses of gift tax valuation.8 5 The court stated that while the safe harbor rate
protects taxpayers from recharacterization of income under § 483, there were
no indications that "the safe harbor rate insulates a taxpayer from the adverse
gift tax effects of § 2512. '86
3. Analysis
An examination of the purpose of § 483 leads to the conclusion that the
Tenth Circuit reached the correct decision. Section 483 serves only to insure
that payments received under an installment sale or promissory note are cor-
rectly characterized, and is solely concerned with the income tax consequences
of such a transaction. Had the promissory notes in Schusterman provided for
interest at five percent, § 483 would take effect, recharacterizing payments of
principal to payments of interest but would have no bearing on valuation.
Since the stated interest rate of the promissory notes met the safe harbor rate,
§ 483 would have no income tax consequences.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit continues to apply established tests in reaching well-
reasoned conclusions to issues involving federal taxation. Generally, the court
appears to favor erring on the side of the taxpayer unless the law conclusively
holds to the contrary. While this is an admirable approach to the tax laws, it
seems lead to muddy analysis, as applied in Burrus, where the area of federal
tax liens remains a thorn in the Tenth Circuit's side.
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